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10 October 1958

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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DAILY BRIEF

I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

USSR: During a five-hour informal conversation with Eric Johnston on 6 October, Khrushchev ranged freely over a wide variety of topics, including Soviet and Chinese economic prospects, the UN, American violations of Soviet air space, Soviet naval strength in the Black Sea, and Soviet censorship. The Soviet leader's remarks appeared in some instances to be candid and in others patently false. After raising the subject of alleged American violations of Soviet air space, Khrushchev said the USSR would "continue to shoot down any planes that violate our border." In discussing Soviet

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economic prospects, he said for the first time that the USSR will have caught up with the US in "per capita production" by the conclusion of a second seven-year plan--in 1972. The **First Seven-Year Plan (1959-1965)**, to be released prior to the January 1959 party congress, will presumably reflect this optimism.

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Lebanon: President Shihab is apparently in the process of replacing the Karame cabinet with a government of technicians. He has asked Nizam al-Akkari, a semiprofessional civil servant whose background suggests that he probably favors the Moslem rebel side, to act as formateur. A politically neutral government of civil servants and military officers would be a stopgap until a compromise between the militant Christian and Moslem elements can be worked out.

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Tunisia: President Bourguiba reiterated on 8 October to the French and American ambassadors that he could not accept arms of French manufacture on any basis, including those supplied by the United States under offshore procurement, so long as the French continue their attempts to suppress the Algerian rebels. He declared that although acquisition of French arms might strengthen him militarily, they "might easily destroy" him politically.

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Pakistan: Immediate reaction from military and civil service personnel and the citizens of Karachi to Mirza's take-over and the imposition of martial law on 7 October is reported to be favorable. Some members of the press and intellectuals feel that unrest is likely to develop eventually. Politicians in both East and West Pakistan are refusing to comment.

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(Available during the preceding week)

Special National Intelligence Estimate No. 30-4-58. The Arab-Israeli Arms Problem--Relative Capabilities and the Prospects for Control. 30 September 1958.

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Khrushchev Forecasts Rapid Economic Growth

Khrushchev, in an interview with Eric Johnston on 6 October, said, "We are going to increase production during the next seven years and then we will have another seven-year plan and by that time will have caught up with the US in production per capita."

In November 1957 Khrushchev predicted only that Soviet production of essential items would equal the present volume of US production in 15 years, and, in this context, made no references to per capita production. It is not clear in this latest statement whether Khrushchev is referring to the present or to the projected future level of US per capita production. An article in Pravda in July, however, stated that even allowing for US expansion the USSR will overtake the US in total industrial output in 10 or 11 years. Considering the growth in Soviet population, the article continued, "only a few more years will be needed to overtake and surpass the US in per capita output. . . ."

The coming Seven-Year Plan (1959-65), to be released about two months before the January party congress, will probably reflect this increased optimism by scheduling production goals higher than would have been necessary to conform with Khrushchev's November forecasts.

Khrushchev described the UN as a puppet show with the United States pulling the strings and said, "We are thinking of getting out." He maintained that Soviet censors merely delete "lies," but the correspondents send them anyway through the diplomatic pouch. In line with China's extremely optimistic agricultural production claims, Khrushchev said that, according to Mao, the Chinese were producing so much grain this year that they "didn't know what to do with it."

Khrushchev also claimed, "We have no navy in the Black Sea and no submarines in the Black Sea, and we are not going

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to put any there." [REDACTED] Soviet
order of battle in the Black Sea presently includes 84 sub-
marines, of which 64 are long range; one battleship; eight
cruisers; 46 destroyer-type ships; and over 300 patrol,
mine, and auxiliary naval vessels.

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II. ASIA-AFRICA

Lebanese Situation

President Shihab is apparently in the process of replacing the Karame cabinet, which had been highly objectionable to the followers of ex-President Chamoun. Karame's probable successor as prime minister, Nizam al-Akkari, a 52-year-old Moslem, is a professional civil servant whose past suggests sympathy for the rebels. He was prime minister for three days prior to the ouster of President al-Khuri in 1952.

Al-Akkari will probably form a cabinet of civilians and military men which will rule directly for Shihab until a compromise between the militant Christian and Moslem elements can be reached. Should the crisis be prolonged, Shihab might threaten to resign in an effort to force a compromise solution.

The Moslem attitude, typified by Karame, continues to be that no supporter of ex-President Chamoun should have a place in the government. Chamoun, for his part, has consistently refused to restrain his followers since he left office.

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